Instead, they argue for a theory of persistence in which a series of continuing cyber fait accomplis cumulatively produce strategic effects. In the Texas National Security Review, Michael Fischerkeller and Richard Harknett argue that proponents have wrongly assumed that coercion is necessary for strategic effects and coercion is nearly impossible - hence the appeal of the intelligence contest. Several observers have pushed back against the intelligence contest concept. Fifth, it is a campaign to preposition assets for intelligence collection in the event of a conflict. Fourth, it is a contest to disable adversary capabilities through sabotage. Third, it is a reciprocal effort to covertly undermine adversary morale, institutions, and alliances. Second, it is a race to exploit that information to improve one’s relative position. Intelligence contests, according to Rovner, are characterized by five core elements:įirst, it is a race among adversaries to collect more and better information. They are also different from diplomacy, which “is about persuading self-interested states that cooperation is in their best interests” rather than “gaining information advantages.” For example, whereas “an intelligence contest is about information, the essence of military conflict is violent coercion.” While wars require some kind of end point, intelligence contests can go on indefinitely. Making this conceptual shift has significant implications for how we understand this space. In a recent article in War on the Rocks, however, Josh Rovner argues that cyber is really more of an intelligence contest. The ‘Cyber as an Intelligence Contest’ ConceptĬyberspace was firmly established as a warfighting domain - alongside sea, land, air, and space - a little over a decade ago. Whereas bolstering resilience may be how we prevent another SolarWinds, signaling of some kind may be an appropriate response to election meddling and help set the parameters of “ agreed competition” the United States can live with. While both are intelligence activities, the U.S. elections, laid out in a recently declassified report from the director of national intelligence, was a work of covert action. Their continued efforts to sow disinformation during U.S. government agencies, appears to be a work of espionage. The hack against SolarWinds, which compromised hundreds of Fortunate 500 companies and U.S. The variety of Russian operations against the United States in recent months clearly illustrates the need for a more refined framework. Moreover, ambivalence about the goals of an operation, or confusion about what a particular operation is, has the potential to yield unwanted results. Responding to covert cyber operations with an espionage mindset, for example, may lead policymakers to exercise forbearance when they should instead be more assertive, and vice versa. Understanding these nuances is critical to setting clear objectives that match what a given situation calls for. The intelligence contest concept in its current form does not explicitly grapple with these differences. Cyber operations focused on information acquisition (i.e., espionage) operate according to a different logic than those meant to exert influence or cause some effect (i.e., covert action). In practice, however, the answers to these questions depend significantly on what kind of intelligence activity we are dealing with.
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